DRB
05-11-2007, 07:24 AM
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18592759/site/newsweek/
What I found telling is the following:
Raymond Dubois, a Vietnam vet who was Rumsfeld's principal staff assistant from October 2002 to May 2005 and later undersecretary of Defense, says he knew Batiste well, and recommended him for his promotion. When Dubois first heard about Batiste's postretirement objections, he says, "I was nonplussed. I thought to myself, 'This isn't same guy who talked to me in my office' about Iraq."
Dubois, who says he still admires Batiste, adds: "I was with [former deputy Defense secretary] Paul Wolfowitz when we went to Iraq to visit with John and his First Infantry Division in Tikrit. I sat next to Batiste on the one side and Paul sat on other side. I can remember the opportunities—that's in the plural—that both Paul and I gave to John [to speak out]. I encouraged John to have private meetings with Paul. He had worked with him for two solid years [as Wolfowitz's assistant]. I find it a little incredible—and I used that word advisedly—that he would not have mentioned something to Paul." In one meeting, Dubois recalls, Rumsfeld asked Batiste during a visit to Tikrit on Christmas Eve of 2004, with media present, whether he had received the resources he had asked for. Batiste declined to say for the cameras. "He talks now about being put on the spot by Rumsfeld in front of the press," says Dubois. "C'mon, you're a general officer, you're a big boy."
To this Batiste responds:
Batiste says that Dubois doesn't know the whole story. "I was extremely vocal within my chain of command," he says. Batiste says he communicated his specific concerns about lack of troops to his former superior, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, head of multinational forces in Iraq, and his successor, Gen. George Casey. "And yes, I did have a meetings in Iraq with Mr. Wolfowitz and Mr. Rumsfeld. Regarding the disputed meeting during Rumsfeld's trip, he says, "In our culture within the military, you don't air the dirty laundry, certainly not with the international and national press." But Batiste adds: "I do remember speaking to both those guys about the frustrations of picking up a brigade element of 3,000 to 5,000 troops in contact with the enemy and moving to another location in Iraq 200 to 300 miles away to deal with an emergency. When you do that you create an immediate vacuum. … It's the whack-a-mole game. They're doing the same thing now."
I think its telling that both the author and Dubois along with a whole host of continue to call into question the public voice that lacked from the military during the lead up and early prosecution of the war in Iraq.
As a result, we may be witnessing a new set of rules being drawn up for civilian-military relations—rules that could forever change this crucial partnership in American political life.
And if the civillian leadership decides to NOT listen, as was true in this case, what does the military do then?
What I found telling is the following:
Raymond Dubois, a Vietnam vet who was Rumsfeld's principal staff assistant from October 2002 to May 2005 and later undersecretary of Defense, says he knew Batiste well, and recommended him for his promotion. When Dubois first heard about Batiste's postretirement objections, he says, "I was nonplussed. I thought to myself, 'This isn't same guy who talked to me in my office' about Iraq."
Dubois, who says he still admires Batiste, adds: "I was with [former deputy Defense secretary] Paul Wolfowitz when we went to Iraq to visit with John and his First Infantry Division in Tikrit. I sat next to Batiste on the one side and Paul sat on other side. I can remember the opportunities—that's in the plural—that both Paul and I gave to John [to speak out]. I encouraged John to have private meetings with Paul. He had worked with him for two solid years [as Wolfowitz's assistant]. I find it a little incredible—and I used that word advisedly—that he would not have mentioned something to Paul." In one meeting, Dubois recalls, Rumsfeld asked Batiste during a visit to Tikrit on Christmas Eve of 2004, with media present, whether he had received the resources he had asked for. Batiste declined to say for the cameras. "He talks now about being put on the spot by Rumsfeld in front of the press," says Dubois. "C'mon, you're a general officer, you're a big boy."
To this Batiste responds:
Batiste says that Dubois doesn't know the whole story. "I was extremely vocal within my chain of command," he says. Batiste says he communicated his specific concerns about lack of troops to his former superior, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, head of multinational forces in Iraq, and his successor, Gen. George Casey. "And yes, I did have a meetings in Iraq with Mr. Wolfowitz and Mr. Rumsfeld. Regarding the disputed meeting during Rumsfeld's trip, he says, "In our culture within the military, you don't air the dirty laundry, certainly not with the international and national press." But Batiste adds: "I do remember speaking to both those guys about the frustrations of picking up a brigade element of 3,000 to 5,000 troops in contact with the enemy and moving to another location in Iraq 200 to 300 miles away to deal with an emergency. When you do that you create an immediate vacuum. … It's the whack-a-mole game. They're doing the same thing now."
I think its telling that both the author and Dubois along with a whole host of continue to call into question the public voice that lacked from the military during the lead up and early prosecution of the war in Iraq.
As a result, we may be witnessing a new set of rules being drawn up for civilian-military relations—rules that could forever change this crucial partnership in American political life.
And if the civillian leadership decides to NOT listen, as was true in this case, what does the military do then?